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The Impact of Private Equity Ownership on Portfolio Firms’ Corporate Tax Planning 
ABSTRACT:  This study investigates whether private equity (PE) firms influence the tax 
practices of their portfolio firms.  Prior research documents that PE firms create economic value 
in portfolio firms through effective governance, financial, and operational engineering.  Given 
PE firms’ focus on value creation, we examine whether PE firms influence the extent and types 
of tax avoidance at portfolio firms as an additional source of economic value.  We document that 
PE-backed portfolio firms engage in significantly more nonconforming tax planning and have 
lower marginal tax rates than other private firms.  Moreover, we document that PE-backed 
portfolio firms pay 14.2 percent less income tax per dollar of pre-tax income than non-PE backed 
firms, after controlling for NOLs and debt tax shields.  We find additional tax savings for PE-
backed portfolio firms that are either majority-owned or owned by large PE firms, consistent 
with PE ownership stake, expertise, and resources serving as important factors in the tax 
practices of portfolio firms.  We infer that PE firms view tax planning as an additional source of 
economic value in their portfolio firms, where the benefits outweigh any potential reputational 
costs associated with corporate tax avoidance.   
 
Keywords:  Private equity; ownership structure; tax avoidance; tax planning; book-tax differences; 
cash effective tax rates; marginal tax rates. 




The Impact of Private Equity Ownership on Portfolio Firms’ Corporate Tax Planning 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Private equity (PE) firms, such as The Blackstone Group, The Carlyle Group, and 
Kohlberg Kravis & Roberts, manage investment funds that generally buy mature businesses via 
leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions.  We refer to these acquired businesses as “portfolio firms” 
or “PE-backed firms”.  While prior research suggests that PE firms create economic value in 
their portfolio firms through effective governance, financial, and operational engineering (e.g., 
Cao and Lerner 2009; Kaplan and Stromberg 2009; Masulis and Thomas 2009), little is known 
about the tax planning of these portfolio firms.  PE firms and their portfolio firms are important 
components of the U.S. capital markets as PE firms participated in more than one-third of initial 
public offerings and in more than one-quarter of U.S. mergers during the past few years (Katz 
2009).  Given PE firms’ importance in the U.S. capital markets and their focus on value creation, 
we investigate whether PE firms utilize tax planning in their portfolio firms as an additional 
source of economic value and test whether PE-backed private firms engage in more tax 
avoidance than other privately-held firms.
1 
We focus on tax avoidance as a source of value for several reasons.  First, recent research 
suggests that corporate tax departments were increasingly viewed as profit centers during the 
1990s and early 2000s (e.g., Crocker and Slemrod 2005; Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver 2009).  
This view of tax departments as profit centers complements PE firms’ focus on value creation at 
portfolio firms, since successful tax planning can generate substantial tax savings that benefits 
both present and future shareholders (e.g., Graham and Tucker 2006; Wilson 2009).  Second, 
                                                            
1 We focus on private firms because public and private firms have different financial reporting incentives, which 
affect the amount and types of tax planning in which public and private firms engage (e.g. Penno and Simon 1986; 
Beatty and Harris 1998; Mikhail 1999; Badertscher, Katz and Rego 2010).  By focusing on private firms, we control 
– in large part – for variation in financial reporting incentives across sample firms. 2 
 
recent editorials suggest that PE firms excel at tax avoidance (e.g., Hutton 2009; Lumbis 2009) 
and also claim that PE firms aggressively manage the tax liabilities of their portfolio firms 
(Behind the Buyout 2007).  Given their close monitoring and control over portfolio firms (e.g. 
Cotter and Peck 2001), PE firms’ tax practices likely influence the tax practices of their portfolio 
firms.  While prior studies have documented that PE-backed portfolio firms substantially reduce 
their tax liabilities through extensive debt financing (e.g. Kaplan 1989; Kaplan and Stromberg 
2009), prior research has not investigated other types of tax planning at these firms. 
We compare the tax practices of PE-backed private firms to those of other privately-held 
firms.  To make these comparisons, we compile samples of private firms with publicly-traded 
debt that are:  1) majority- or minority-owned by PE firms (majority or minority PE-backed 
firms), or 2) owned by the company’s management or employees (non-PE-backed firms).  While 
these different types of private firms are similar in many respects, including more highly 
concentrated equity ownership and a greater reliance on debt financing than publicly-traded 
firms
 (e.g., Renneboog and Simons 2005; Katz 2009; Givoly, Hayn and Katz 2010), they are 
different in at least two important dimensions.  First, as repeat players in the debt and equity 
markets, PE firms are likely concerned with their reputations as creators of economic value (e.g., 
Cao and Lerner 2009).  These reputational considerations may cause PE firms to discourage 
aggressive tax avoidance at portfolio firms, since aggressive tax avoidance can impose net costs 
on both firms and shareholders (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; 
Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 2010).  Second, PE firms have substantial expertise and 
resources at their disposal (e.g., Cao and Lerner 2009; Kaplan and Stromberg 2009), enhancing 
their ability to promote effective tax strategies that create economic value at portfolio firms.  3 
 
Thus, it is an empirical question whether PE-backed private firms engage in more or less tax 
avoidance than other private firms. 
We utilize three measures of tax avoidance that reflect tax planning that reduces a firm’s 
tax liability without reducing the firm’s financial income (i.e., book-tax nonconforming tax 
planning).  This type of tax planning includes standard tax practices that do not violate income 
tax rules (e.g., locating subsidiaries in low-tax foreign countries), as well as aggressive tax 
strategies that are considered abusive by the IRS and the Treasury Department (e.g., sale-in-
lease-out transactions).  However, these three measures do not reflect tax planning that affects 
book and taxable income in a similar manner (i.e., book-tax conforming tax planning), including 
the tax benefits of debt financing.  Thus, we also use simulated marginal tax rates as introduced 
by Graham (1996) as an additional proxy for corporate tax avoidance.  Finally, we hand-collect 
tax footnote information from audited financial reports, to more precisely identify the methods of 
tax avoidance used by private firms.  
Our results indicate that PE-backed firms engage in significantly more nonconforming 
tax planning and have lower marginal tax rates than other private firms.  These results hold 
despite controls for factors known to cause variation in tax avoidance across firms, including 
current year losses, net operating loss carryforwards (NOLs), foreign income, leverage, size, and 
the tax benefits of employee stock options.  In particular, we find that PE-backed firms pay 14.2 
percent less income tax per dollar of adjusted pre-tax income than non-PE-backed private firms, 
even after controlling for NOLs and debt tax shields.  In addition, we find that majority PE-
backed firms engage in more tax avoidance than minority PE-backed firms, and portfolio firms 
that are owned by larger PE firms engage in more tax avoidance than portfolio firms that are 4 
 
owned by smaller PE firms.
2  Lastly, results from the tax footnote analyses are consistent with 
portfolio firms using sale and leaseback transactions, foreign operations, tax-exempt 
investments, and tax credits to reduce their income taxes.  
Taken together, our results are consistent with PE firms having the resources and 
expertise to promote greater tax avoidance at portfolio firms, and this effect is more prevalent for 
portfolio firms that are either majority-owned or owned by larger PE firms.  Our results are also 
consistent with the benefits of tax planning by PE portfolio firms outweighing the associated 
costs, including any potential reputational costs associated with aggressive tax avoidance.  Thus, 
PE ownership in general – and majority PE ownership or ownership by a large PE firm in 
particular – generates additional tax benefits and creates additional economic value for portfolio 
firms that exceeds those for other private firms.  We infer that PE firms view tax planning as an 
additional source of economic value in portfolio firms.  
Our study makes several contributions to the accounting and finance literatures.  First, 
although private firms are important components of the U.S. economy, little is known about the 
tax practices of private firms with different ownership structures, primarily due to the lack of 
publicly available financial information.
3  We utilize financial information for private firms with 
publicly-traded debt to further our understanding of tax practices at large, private companies.  
Second, Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) note that little is known about the cross-sectional 
differences in the willingness of firms to minimize taxes, and point out that insider control and 
other organizational features, such as ownership structure, are important but understudied factors 
                                                            
2 We measure PE firm size based on the amount of capital under management, where PE firm size is a proxy for PE 
firm reputation.  See section IV for further discussion. 
3 Ninety-nine percent of the companies operating in the United States are private (AICPA 2004) and therefore are 
not required to register under the Securities Act of 1933.  Hence, prior tax research was primarily limited to the 
comparison of public and private firms in regulated industries or to the use of survey data (e.g. Beatty and Harris 
1998; Mikhail 1999; Penno and Simon 1986; Cloyd, Pratt, and Stock 1996) and did not explore different ownership 
structures within private firms. 5 
 
that impact corporate tax avoidance.  Hence, our study furthers our understanding of the impact 
of ownership structure on income tax reporting practices in general.   
Finally, our research is important because of the growing significance of PE firms for the 
U.S. capital markets.  The cumulative capital commitments to non-venture capital PE firms in 
the U.S. between 1980 and 2006 is estimated to be close to $1.4 trillion (Stromberg 2008).  In 
addition, approximately $400 billion of PE-backed transactions were announced in both 2006 
and 2007, representing over 2 percent of the total capitalization of the U.S. stock market in each 
of these years (Kaplan 2009).  Despite a decline in PE transactions since 2007, experts maintain 
that PE firms have become a permanent component of U.S. investment activity (e.g., Kaplan 
2009; Kaplan and Stromberg 2009).  While prior research examines PE-backed portfolio firms’ 
governance, financial and operational strategies, as well as their long-term financial performance 
and financial reporting quality (e.g. Acharya, Hahn and Kehow 2009; Cao and Lerner 2009; 
Kaplan and Stromberg 2009; Katz 2009; Masulis and Thomas 2009), little is known about PE-
backed portfolio firms’ tax practices.  Given the strong criticisms of PE firms’ investment 
policies and tax treatment, regulators, investors, and researchers will benefit from a deeper 
understanding of whether and how PE firms create economic value in portfolio firms through tax 
planning.
4 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses background and 
develops hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the research design.  Section 4 provides a description 
of the data collection procedures, descriptive statistics, and presents results.  Section 5 concludes. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
                                                            
4 The rapid growth of the PE industry has raised concerns regarding anticompetitive behavior, excessive tax benefits, 
and stock manipulations in this sector [see Katz (2009) and section II for further discussion].  PE-backed initial 
public offerings (IPOs) have been the subject of particular scrutiny, as PE firms have been criticized for pushing 
over-leveraged portfolio firms too quickly into the public market (Cao and Lerner 2009). 6 
 
Private Equity Firms 
PE firms have received much attention in recent years due to their substantial impact on 
merger and acquisition activity and their generous tax treatment in the U.S. and other countries.  
PE firms, which are typically organized as limited partnerships, manage investment funds (PE 
funds) that generally buy mature, profitable businesses via LBOs (see Figure 1).  These 
transactions often involve substantial amounts of debt, resulting in highly leveraged portfolio 
firms.  PE funds have limited life spans (approximately 10 years) and typically receive a 20 
percent share (i.e., ‘carried interest’) of any gains generated by the sale or IPO of their portfolio 
firms, in addition to an annual management fee (Kaplan and Stromberg 2009).  While the 
management fees are taxed as ordinary income (tax rate is 35 percent), the carried interest is 
taxed as long-term capital gain (tax rate is 15 percent).  This tax treatment of carried interest, as 
well as the fact that some PE firms have been able to avoid corporate taxation once they file for 
an initial public offering (e.g., The Blackstone Group) has provoked numerous negative press 
reports, proposed changes to federal income tax laws, and several academic studies (e.g. 
Fleischer 2007, 2008; Knoll 2007; Cunningham and Engler 2008; Lawton 2008). 
The generally negative view of the tax benefits enjoyed by PE firms contrasts other 
characteristics associated with their management of portfolio firms.  PE firms typically take a 
controlling stake in their portfolio firms with the intent of substantially improving the 
performance of their investments.  Results in prior research suggest that PE firms act as effective 
monitors of their portfolios firms.  This effective monitoring, combined with PE firms’ financial, 
governance, and operational strategies, as well as reputational considerations, have a positive 
impact on their portfolio firms’ long-term financial performance, as well as financial reporting 7 
 
quality (e.g. Acharya et al. 2009; Cao and Lerner 2009; Kaplan and Stromberg 2009; Katz 2009; 
Masulis and Thomas 2009). 
Hypothesis Development 
A priori, it is not clear whether PE-backed private firms will engage in more or less tax 
avoidance than non-PE-backed, private firms.  Indeed, PE- and non-PE-backed private firms are 
similar in many dimensions, including their lower agency costs due to concentrated stock 
ownership, less financial reporting pressure, and extensive reliance on debt financing relative to 
public firms (e.g. Katz 2009).  However, PE- and non-PE-backed private firms differ in at least 
two important dimensions.  First, PE-backed private firms are subject to greater reputational 
concerns than other private firms.  Second, PE-backed private firms generally have more 
sophisticated owners that possess greater expertise and resources than other private firm owners.  
We discuss the potential impact of these two institutional differences on private firms’ tax 
avoidance in the paragraphs that follow. 
Because PE firms are ‘repeat players’ in the LBO debt market and the initial public-
offering (IPO) equity market, they likely have greater reputational concerns than other owners of 
private firms (Cao and Lerner 2009).  If PE firms engage in aggressive behaviors that diminish 
the value of their portfolio firms, they will incur reputational costs that can limit future access to 
these capital markets.  Indeed, Katz (2009) cites these reputational concerns as one reason for the 
higher earnings quality exhibited by PE-backed firms.   
Similar to connotations associated with low earnings quality, aggressive tax planning 
could suggest that deception on a firm’s tax return extends to other managerial actions, and that 
management is dishonest with shareholders, as well.  For example, Desai and Dharmapla (2006) 
conjecture that complex tax shelter transactions that are designed to obscure the economic 8 
 
substance of such transactions may also obscure a firm’s financial reporting and increase the 
opportunities for managerial rent extraction.  Building on this conjecture, Chen et al. (2010) 
argue that dominant owner-managers of family-owned firms are willing to forgo the benefits of 
aggressive tax planning to avoid the potential non-tax (reputational) cost of a stock price 
discount, which could be imposed by other minority shareholders that believe tax aggressiveness 
masks rent extraction by the family owner-managers.  Consistent with tax aggressiveness 
imposing reputational costs, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) provide empirical evidence that the 
public disclosure of participation in a tax shelter transaction is associated with significant and 
negative stock returns.   
Thus, PE firms risk reputational costs if their portfolio firms are labeled as overly tax 
aggressive.  For example, when portfolio firms ‘go public,’ they could be valued at a discount by 
investors due to concerns about contingent income tax liabilities.  Alternatively, PE firms’ cost 
of capital could be directly affected by tax aggressiveness if the capital markets view PE firms as 
imposing excess risk on portfolio firms.  These reputational considerations are intensified in light 
of recent public scrutiny of the favorable tax treatments from which PE firms benefit (e.g. the 
taxation of carried interest), and suggest that PE-backed private firms may engage in less tax 
avoidance than other private firms that are not subject to similar reputational concerns. 
The other dimension in which PE-backed private firms differ from other private firms is 
the fact that their owners (i.e., PE firms) are generally more sophisticated and possess greater 
expertise and resources than other private firm owners.  Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) describe 
PE firms as sophisticated managers of portfolio firms due to their financial, governance, and 
operational engineering strategies.  In particular, PE firms more closely align the incentives of 
portfolio firm managers with those of shareholders through extensive use of stock-based 9 
 
compensation (e.g., Jensen 1989; Jensen and Murphy 1990).  PE firms rely on extensive debt 
financing that generates substantial tax benefits (e.g., Kaplan 1989), and reduces the ‘free cash 
flow’ problem by pressuring managers to maximize net cash flows to make interest and principle 
payments (Jensen 1986).  In addition, PE firms require the boards of portfolio firms to meet 
frequently, monitor management teams closely, and bring industry and operating expertise to 
portfolio firms through the use of consultants (Acharya et al. 2009).   
The greater expertise and resources of PE firms should affect the tax strategies that they 
and their portfolio firms employ.  Over the past 20 years, successful tax strategies have 
increasingly required greater financial and operational resources, as well as in-house tax 
expertise and/or the use of high-priced tax consultants, to execute complex tax shelter 
transactions (e.g., Crocker and Slemrod 2005; Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver 2009).  In essence, 
modern, aggressive tax avoidance requires a minimum level of corporate “sophistication,” where 
sophistication implies access to managerial expertise.  Consistent with this link between 
corporate sophistication and tax avoidance, Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2009) find evidence 
that firms with more sophisticated managers (i.e., those with an MBA degree) have lower cash 
effective tax rates than firms with less sophisticated managers.   
We assert that PE firm managers are generally more sophisticated than managers at other 
privately-held firms.  For example, Fraser-Sampson (2007) notes that PE managers often have 
accounting, investment banking, or management consulting backgrounds.  Managers with these 
backgrounds are more likely to facilitate and promote aggressive tax avoidance at portfolio firms 
than managers with other backgrounds (e.g., engineering or product development).  These 
arguments suggest that PE-backed firms may engage in more tax avoidance than other private 
firms due to the greater expertise and resources of their PE owners.   10 
 
In sum, PE-backed private firms differ from other private firms with respect to their 
greater reputational concerns and to the greater expertise and resources of their private owners.  
While their greater reputational concerns suggest that PE-backed firms engage in less tax 
avoidance than other private firms, the superior expertise and resources of their private owners 
suggest that PE-backed firms engage in more tax avoidance than other private firms.  Thus, our 
first hypothesis is non-directional:  
H1: PE-backed private firms exhibit systematically different levels of tax avoidance than 
non-PE-backed private firms. 
A significant difference in tax avoidance between PE-backed private firms and non-PE-backed 
private firms would suggest that PE ownership has a significant impact on the tax strategies of 
private firms. 
H1 compares the tax practices of PE-backed firms and non-PE-backed firms.  However, 
PE firms are likely to have the greatest impact on their portfolio firms when they have a majority 
ownership stake, which would provide greater opportunities for close monitoring and control of 
portfolio firms relative to a minority ownership stake (e.g. Cao and Lerner 2009; Kaplan and 
Stromberg 2009; Katz 2009).  As a consequence, PE firms with a majority ownership stake are 
more likely to influence a portfolio firm’s tax strategies than PE firms with a minority stake.  
Whether majority PE-backed firms engage in more or less tax avoidance than minority PE-
backed firms depends on the relative impacts of PE:  1) reputational concerns, and 2) expertise 
and resources, on the tax practices of portfolio firms.  Thus, our second hypothesis is also non-
directional: 
H2: Private firms that are majority-owned by PE firms exhibit systematically different 
levels of tax avoidance than private firms that are minority-owned by PE firms. 11 
 
A significant difference in tax avoidance between majority- and minority PE-backed firms would 
suggest that ownership control is important for PE firms to have a significant impact on portfolio 
firms’ tax strategies. 
Cao and Lerner (2009) and Katz (2009) contend that PE firm size is a good proxy for PE 
reputational concerns.  That is, large PE firms, with more assets under management, likely have 
greater reputational concerns than small PE firms, since large PE firms have greater capital at 
risk and engage in more LBO and IPO transactions than small PE firms.  These greater 
reputational concerns of large PE firms could lead to less aggressive tax planning at portfolio 
companies.  However, large PE firms also likely have greater expertise and resources than small 
PE firms, consistent with large PE firms having the ability to promote more sophisticated and 
effective tax planning at portfolio firms than small PE firms.  Thus, our last hypothesis compares 
the tax avoidance of private firms that are owned by large vs. small PE firms.  Similar to our 
prior hypotheses, our third hypothesis is non-directional: 
H3: Private firms that are owned by large PE firms exhibit systematically different levels 
of tax avoidance than private firms that are owned by small PE firms. 
A significant difference in tax avoidance between private firms that are owned by large versus 
small PE firms would suggest that PE firm size (as a proxy for PE firm reputation and/or 
expertise and resources) is an important factor for PE firms to have a significant impact on 
portfolio firms’ tax strategies. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Measures of Corporate Tax Avoidance 
We rely on several proxies for corporate tax avoidance because different measures reflect 
different types of tax planning and degrees of tax aggressiveness.  We use three measures that 12 
 
reflect book-tax nonconforming tax planning, which reduces a firm’s income tax liability but not 
its financial income, including total book-tax differences, discretionary permanent book-tax 
differences, and cash effective tax rates.
5  We also use marginal tax rates, which are widely-used 
in both accounting and finance research and reflect a broad range of tax strategies.  We discuss 
each of these proxies in the paragraphs that follow. 
Our first proxy for nonconforming tax planning is an estimate of the difference between a 
firm’s pretax book income and its taxable income, also referred to as total book-tax differences 
or BTD.  There are a number of studies that suggest book-tax differences can be used as a signal 
of tax planning activity.  Mills (1998) finds that proposed IRS audit adjustments are positively 
related to large positive book-tax differences.  Desai (2003) posits that the growing difference 
between book and taxable income during the 1990’s was caused by increased levels of tax 
sheltering.  In addition, Wilson (2009) finds that book-tax differences are positively associated 
with actual cases of tax sheltering.  Despite evidence that large positive book-tax differences are 
associated with tax avoidance activity, this measure has limitations.  Manzon and Plesko (2002) 
and Hanlon (2003) identify firm specific characteristics associated with book-tax differences that 
are not necessarily reflective of corporate tax planning.  For example, firms with large capital 
expenditures likely have significant book-tax differences due to depreciation.  In addition, results 
in Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003) and Hanlon (2005) suggest that temporary book-tax 
differences are associated with earnings management activities.  To the extent that earnings 
management and innate firm characteristics unrelated to tax avoidance are the primary 
                                                            
5 Book-tax nonconforming tax planning includes the utilization of research and development tax credits, locating 
operations in a low-tax foreign country, shifting income recognition from high-tax to low-tax locations, engaging in 
synthetic lease transactions (that are treated as operating leases for financial reporting purposes and capital leases for 
tax purposes), and utilizing non-corporate entities to generate deductions or losses that reduce consolidated taxable 
income.  Each of these transactions affects book and taxable income differently, generating temporary or permanent 
book-tax differences. 13 
 
determinants of book-tax differences, book-tax differences will be a noisy proxy for tax planning 
activities.  
Many aggressive tax strategies result in permanent book-tax differences.  The majority of 
cases of tax sheltering examined by Wilson (2009) resulted in permanent book-tax differences.  
Further, the U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation (1999), Weisbach (2002), and Shevlin 
(2002) describe the ideal tax shelter as creating permanent, rather than temporary, book-tax 
differences.  Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) adjust permanent differences to reflect only those 
differences that reflect managerial discretion.
6  Thus, our second measure of nonconforming tax 
planning is discretionary permanent differences, DTAX, as computed by Frank et al.  This 
measure is also subject to several limitations.  DTAX excludes tax strategies that defer income 
recognition or accelerate expense recognition for tax relative to book purposes (i.e., that create 
temporary book-tax differences).  And similar to discretionary accrual models, DTAX attempts to 
model ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behavior for a firm, and thus is subject to many of the same 
criticisms as discretionary accrual models.  Nonetheless, Frank et al. (2009) show that both 
DTAX and BTD are associated with actual cases of tax sheltering. 
Our third measure of nonconforming tax planning is the cash effective tax rate 
(CASH_ETR) introduced by Dyreng et al. (2008).  We calculate CASH_ETR as the ratio of cash 
income taxes paid to pretax book income less special items.
7  Dyreng et al. (2008) describe how 
this measure of tax avoidance has several advantages over the traditional effective tax rate (ETR) 
(i.e., the ratio of total tax expense to pretax income).  First, CASH_ETR is not affected by 
                                                            
6 Specifically, Frank et al. regress total permanent differences on nondiscretionary items unrelated to tax planning 
that are known to cause permanent differences.  The nondiscretionary items include intangible assets and state tax 
expense, among others.  Frank et al. use the residual from the regression as a proxy for tax aggressiveness, which 
they refer to as DTAX.  See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the computation of this variable. 
7 We have insufficient time series data for each firm to follow the methodology in Dyreng et al. (2008), which 
computes CASH_ETR over 5- and 10-year time intervals.  Thus, we compute CASH_ETR on an annual basis. 14 
 
changes in tax contingencies, also known as the tax cushion.
8  So regardless of whether a firm 
records a tax cushion in its financial statements, the lower cash tax payments associated with 
aggressive tax positions will be reflected in a lower CASH_ETR.  Second, the CASH_ETR 
measure is reduced by the tax benefit associated with employee stock options and therefore 
provides a better measure of the firm’s true tax burden than the traditional ETR measure.  
Despite these advantages, CASH_ETR still contains some measurement error, as this measure 
does not control for nondiscretionary sources of book-tax differences (e.g., depreciable and 
amortizable assets) and is biased downward for those firms that consistently manage their pretax 
book-income upward over extended periods of time.  In addition, CASH_ETR contains 
measurement error as a proxy for current year tax avoidance when measured over short time 
periods, due to the impact of estimated tax payments, tax refunds, and settlements with tax 
authorities related to prior year tax returns.  
Measures of nonconforming tax planning do not reflect tax planning that reduces a firm’s 
book and taxable income (i.e., book-tax conforming tax planning), which is often accomplished 
via “real transaction management”, such as accelerating research and development and 
advertising expenditures or deferring revenue recognition to future periods.  Prior research also 
demonstrates that the tax benefits of debt financing (which are typically book-tax conforming) 
are a major source of value in public-to-private transactions (e.g., Kaplan 1989; Schipper and 
Smith 1991).  Thus, we also use simulated marginal tax rates (MTR), as first introduced in 
                                                            
8 A firm must record a tax contingency or tax cushion when there is a significant probability that the firm will pay a 
tax authority (e.g., the IRS) additional income tax related to a prior or current year tax return.  For example, if the 
firm expects to pay additional income tax related to an IRS audit of a prior year tax return.  This increase in the tax 
contingency or tax cushion will increase the firm’s total tax expense, but does not reflect a true cash outflow for the 
firm, and thus current period tax expense is “overstated” from a cash flow perspective.  See Cazier, Rego, Tian, and 
Wilson (2009) for further discussion of income tax contingencies. 15 
 
Graham (1996), as a proxy for corporate tax avoidance,
9 since these tax rates reflect both book-
tax conforming and nonconforming tax planning, including the tax benefits of debt financing.
10   
Marginal tax rates are generally defined as the present value of income taxes that would 
be paid on an additional dollar of taxable income.  One significant difference between marginal 
tax rates and the nonconforming proxies for corporate tax avoidance is with respect to the types 
of tax strategies these measures reflect.  In particular, marginal tax rates (MTR) reflect book-tax 
conforming and nonconforming tax planning, while BTD, DTAX, and CASH_ETR only reflect 
tax strategies that affect book and taxable income differently.  In addition, MTR, BTD, and 
CASH_ETR reflect “temporary” tax strategies, while DTAX is designed to reflect “permanent” – 
and some would argue more aggressive – tax strategies.
11   
Modeling the Impact of PE Ownership on Tax Avoidance Activity 
To investigate whether PE ownership impacts a private firm’s level of tax avoidance, we 
estimate equation (1) below, based on samples of PE-backed and non-PE-backed private firms.
12   
TAXi = 0 + 1PE_BACKEDi + 2LOSSi + 3LOSS×PE_BACKEDi + 4NOLi + 
5NOL×PE_BACKEDi + 6LEVi + 7LEV×PE_BACKEDi + 8MNCi + 
9INTANGi + 10EQ_EARNi + 11SALES_GRi + 12AB_ACCRi + 13ASSETSi + 
14INV_MILLSi + ji YEARi + kl INDUSi + i                 (1) 
                                                            
9 We conduct our analyses based on marginal tax rates after interest expense to capture the tax benefits of debt 
financing.  However, all results are quantitatively similar (untabulated) when we re-run our analyses based on 
marginal tax rates before interest expense (Graham 1996; Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim 1998). 
10 Dyreng et al. (2008) suggest an alternative specification for CASH_ETR,  the ratio of cash taxes paid to pre-tax 
cash flows from operations, to eliminate the use of pre-tax income as an earnings benchmark and to capture both 
conforming and nonconforming tax avoidance practices (similar to marginal tax rates).  For further discussion see 
Hanlon and Heitzman 2009.  Untabulated results for analyses based on this alternative specification for CASH_ETR 
are qualitatively similar to those tabulated for MTR across all analyses. 
11 “Temporary” tax strategies reverse through time because they temporarily accelerate expense recognition or defer 
revenue recognition, while “permanent” tax strategies affect book and taxable income differently, and in a manner 
that is not expected to reverse (e.g., shifting income from a high-tax to a low-tax location). 
12 As discussed in Section IV, we obtain our sample of private firms from COMPUSTAT.  These firms have 
privately-owned equity but publicly-traded debt.  The non-PE-backed private firms are firms whose equity is 
majority-owned by the company’s management or employees and hence are not owned by PE firms. 16 
 
See Appendix A for a detailed definition of each variable included in equation (1).  The 
dependent variable, TAX, represents the four proxies for tax avoidance:  BTD, DTAX, 
CASH_ETR and MTR.  We include an indicator variable, PE_BACKED, which equals one if a 
PE firm has a majority or minority ownership stake in a private firm, and zero otherwise.  If PE-
backed firms engage in more tax avoidance than non-PE-backed firms, then the coefficient on 
PE_BACKED should be positive (negative) and significant in regressions where BTD and DTAX 
(CASH_ETR and MTR) are the dependent variables. 
Equation (1) includes controls for factors that affect a firm’s tax avoidance activity, as 
documented by prior research (e.g., Manzon and Plesko 2002; Rego 2003; Dyreng et al. 2008; 
Frank et al. 2009; Wilson 2009; Chen et al. 2010).  The first set of control variables, which 
includes LOSS, NOL, and LEV, controls for a firm’s need to tax plan.  We include an indicator 
variable, LOSS, as a proxy for current profitability, since profitable firms have greater incentive 
to tax plan.
13  LOSS equals 1 if a firm’s pre-tax income is less than zero, and 0 otherwise.  We 
include an indicator variable for the presence of net operating loss carryforwards (NOL) at the 
beginning of the year, since firms with loss carryforwards have less incentive to engage in 
current year tax planning.  We include a firm’s leverage ratio (LEV) because firms with greater 
leverage have less need to tax plan due to the tax benefits of debt financing.  We also interact 
PE_BACKED with LOSS, NOL, and LEV to control for any significantly different rates of LOSS, 
NOL, and LEV in PE-backed vs. non-PE-backed private firm-years.   
We include an indicator variable for foreign operations (MNC) in equation (1), since 
firms with foreign operations have greater opportunities for tax avoidance by shifting income 
between high and low tax rate locations (e.g., Rego 2003).  MNC equals one if a firm reports 
                                                            
13 When we replace LOSS with alternative measures of profitability, including return on assets, return on net 
operating assets, and cash flows from operations, results are substantially the same as those tabulated in this study.   17 
 
foreign income or foreign tax expense, and zero otherwise.  We control for intangible assets 
(INTANG) and equity in earnings of unconsolidated affiliates (EQ_EARN) because these items 
often generate differences between book and taxable income and can thus affect our 
nonconforming measures of tax avoidance.
14  We include sales growth (SALES_GR) in equation 
(1) because growing firms likely make larger investments in depreciable assets, which generate 
larger temporary book-tax differences.  We control for firm size (ASSETS), since large firms 
enjoy economies of scale in tax planning, and we include year (YEAR) and industry (INDUS) 
fixed-effects to control for fundamental differences in tax planning that may exist across years 
and industries.
15 
Frank et al. (2009) find a strong positive relation between financial and tax reporting 
aggressiveness.  To the extent our test and control firms exhibit different financial reporting 
quality, we need to control for financial reporting quality in equation (1).  Katz (2009) 
documents that PE-backed firms report more conservatively and engage in less earnings 
management compared to non-PE-backed firms.  Thus, we control for both timely loss 
recognition and earnings management by including AB_ACCR in equation (1).  AB_ACCR is the 
amount of abnormal accruals after controlling for conservatism in our abnormal accruals 
calculation (see Ball and Shivakumar 2006).   
Our last control variable is the inverse Mills ratio (INV_MILLS) from the first stage of the 
Heckman (1979) sample selection correction procedure.  This two-stage estimation procedure 
corrects for any endogeneity associated with PE firm investment decisions.  In the first stage, we 
                                                            
14 We note that the Pearson correlation between intangible assets and property, plant, and equipment (PPE) is 
approximately 58 percent.  Thus, we do not include both proxies for nondiscretionary sources of book-tax 
differences in equation (1).  When we replace INTANG with PPE, results are qualitatively similar. 
15 When we replace ASSETS with SALES our results remain qualitatively similar.   18 
 
estimate the following probit regression (results not tabulated), which predicts whether a private 
company is majority- or minority-owned by a PE firm (PE_BACKED):   
PE_BACKED = 0 + 1BVE + 2RNOA + 3Q_RATIO + 4OPER_CYCLE + 
5FIRM_AGE + 6CASH + 7CAP_EXP + 8BIG_AUDIT + 9LOSS + 
10NOL + 11LEV + 12MNC + 13INTANG + 14EQ_EARN + 
15SALES_GR + 16AB_ACCR + 17ASSETS +   (2) 
See Appendix A for complete definitions of the variables included in equation (2).  Equation (2) 
is based on models of PE ownership in Hochberg (2008), Beuselinck, Deloof, and Manigart 
(2009), and Katz (2009).  See also Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Givoly et al. (2010) for a 
similar approach in the comparison of private and public firms.  We compute the inverse Mills’ 
ratio for each firm-year observation based on the estimated coefficients for equation (2), and then 
include that variable in equation (1), the second stage of the Heckman estimation procedure.
16 
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Sample Selection  
Our initial sample consists of private firms that have publicly-traded debt.  Because their 
debt is public, these firms must file financial statements with the SEC, even though their equity 
is privately-held.  We follow Katz (2009) and select all firm-year observations on COMPUSTAT 
in any of the 28 years from 1978 through 2005 that satisfy the following criteria:  (1) the firm’s 
stock price at fiscal year-end is unavailable, (2) the firm has total debt as well as total annual 
revenues exceeding $1 million, (3) the firm is a domestic company, (4) the firm is not a 
                                                            
16 We estimate the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure using Lee’s (1979) switching simultaneous equation (see 
Maddala, 1983, Chapter 9).  The use of an endogenous switching regression model (as in Bharath, Sunder and 
Sunder 2008) produces estimates that are substantially similar to those tabulated in this study.  We obtain a 68 
percent MacKelvey-Zavonia pseudo-R-square in the first-stage probit regression that accompanies Table 3 (results 
untabulated), which validates the relevance of our chosen control variables.  19 
 
subsidiary of another public firm, and (5) the firm is not a financial institution or in a regulated 
industry (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4800-4900). 
To ensure that the sample includes only private firms with public debt, we examine each 
firm and remove public firm observations (details provided in Table 1, Panel A).  We further 
categorize each firm as being in one of the following categories:  (1) PE majority-owned, defined 
as firms whose equity is majority-owned (i.e., more than 50 percent) by PE firms (according to 
Thomson Financials VentureXpert), (2) PE minority-owned, defined as firms whose equity is 
minority-owned (i.e., less than or equal to 50 percent) by PE firms, and (3) management- or 
employee-owned, defined as firms that do not have a PE sponsor and are at least 50 percent 
owned by founders, executives, directors, family members, or employees.  In order to identify 
large and small PE firms we follow Katz (2009) and rank the PE firms according to total U.S. 
dollar investment during the years 1980-2005, utilizing the Thomson Financials VentureXpert.  
The resulting sample consists of 2,615 private firm-year observations and 523 private firms.
17 
[PLACE TABLE 1 HERE] 
To more precisely identify the specific means of tax avoidance used by portfolio firms, we hand-
collect tax footnote information from SEC financial filings.  In particular, for each year in our 
sample we randomly select three observations of minority-PE-backed firms
18 and match them 
with both majority-PE-backed firms and non-PE-backed private firms in the same year and the 
                                                            
17 Prior to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, firms could acquire other firms in taxable transactions that would generate a 
“step-up” in the target company’s adjusted tax basis in assets.  Since the 1986 Tax Reform Act, taxable asset 
acquisitions only generate step-up in asset basis in transactions where the target company also recognizes gain on 
the sale of assets; consequently, few such transactions occur in the post-1986 time period (Chatfield and Newbould 
1996).  This differential tax treatment in the pre- and post- 1986 time periods could potentially affect our analyses. 
Hence, in untabulated sensitivity analyses we both cluster the standard errors in our regression analyses based on 
firm and year, and run tests excluding firms that engaged in public-to-private transactions between 1980 and 1986.  
All results are substantially similar to those tabulated in this study. 
18 SFAS No. 109 significantly modified the accounting for income taxes and the related tax footnote disclosures.  
Thus, we hand-collected tax footnote data only for years since SFAS No. 109 went into effect (i.e., 1994 – 2005).  
To include all minority-PE-backed firms in our sample, we included four observations of minority PE-backed firms 
for fiscal years 1994 and 1995, instead of the three observations included for fiscal years 1996 – 2005.   20 
 
same four-digit SIC code.  If a match is not available in the same four-digit SIC code, we then 
find a match in the same three- (or two-) digit SIC code.  Thus, our sample of hand-collected 
data includes 38 firms that are majority PE-backed, 38 firms that are minority PE-backed, and 38 
firms that are non-PE backed. 
Results for Tests that Compare PE-Backed and Non-PE-Backed Firm-Years 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our samples of PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
private firms.
19  Panel A contains the statistics for broad firm characteristics, while Panel B 
contains statistics for the measures of tax avoidance.  There are two rows of data shown for each 
variable, where the first row (in bold) contains data for the PE-backed private firm-years and the 
second row (not in bold) contains data for the non-PE-backed private firm-years.  Panel A shows 
that PE-backed private firms are significantly less profitable (e.g., ROA, RNOA, CFO, LOSS, and 
NOL) than non-PE-backed firms.  This lower profitability (except for RNOA, which measures 
profitability but excludes the effect of leverage) could be driven in part by the heavy debt burden 
that PE portfolio firms are known to carry.  In fact, the results in Panel A indicate that PE-backed 
private firms have significantly higher leverage ratios (e.g., mean LEV of 0.706 vs. 0.567) and 
incur greater interest expense (e.g., mean INT_EXP of 0.084 vs. 0.071) than non-PE-backed 
firms.  Panel A also shows that PE-backed private firms are more likely to have foreign 
operations (MNC), report more total and intangible assets (ASSETS and INTANG), but fewer 
sales (SALES) and smaller abnormal accruals (AB_ACCR) than non-PE-backed firms.  This latter 
result is consistent with Katz (2009), which finds that PE-backed private firms report lower 
abnormal accruals than non-PE-backed firms. 
[PLACE TABLE 2 HERE] 
                                                            
19 We winsorize all continuous variables included in the regressions at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. The t-statistics 
have been further adjusted to control for the clustering by multiple firm observations.  21 
 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the measures of tax avoidance.  The results 
indicate that PE-backed firms engage in more tax avoidance than non-PE-backed firms.  In 
particular, mean BTD, the proxy for the difference between a firms’ pretax book income and its 
taxable income, is statistically higher (-0.019 vs. -0.034) for PE-backed than non-PE-backed 
private firm-years.  Similarly, mean DTAX, a proxy for more aggressive, nonconforming tax 
planning, is also significantly higher (-0.049 vs. -0.075) for PE-backed firm-years, while mean 
CASH_ETR and mean MTR are significantly lower (0.318 vs. 0.351 and 0.123 and 0.211, 
respectively) for PE-backed firm-years.   
Panel C presents Pearson and Spearman correlations between the PE_BACKED indicator 
variable and each measure of tax avoidance.  Consistent with Panel B, the correlations in Panel C 
indicate that PE-backed private firm-years engage in more tax avoidance than non-PE-backed 
private firm-years.  In addition, most of the correlations between the measures of tax avoidance 
are as expected (under the assumption that all four variables capture the same underlying 
construct).  For example, BTD and DTAX should be positively associated with each other and 
negatively associated with the effective tax rate measures (CASH_ETR and MTR).  Similarly, the 
effective tax rate measures should be positively associated with each other.  In contrast to 
expectations, MTR is positively related to total book-tax differences (BTD).
20  
Table 3 contains the regression results for tests of H1, which predicts that PE-backed 
private firms engage in different levels of tax avoidance than non-PE-backed firms.  The 
coefficients on all four measures of tax avoidance in Table 3 are significant and suggest that PE-
backed private firms are more tax aggressive than non-PE-backed private firms.  That is, the 
coefficients on PE_BACKED are significant and positive (negative) in the BTD and DTAX 
                                                            
20 The positive correlation between MTR and BTD is driven in part by firms with negative pre-tax income.  
Specifically, the correlation between MTR and BTD is 0.125 and significant for firms with negative pre-tax income.  
In contrast, the correlation is 0.038 and not significantly different from zero for firms with positive pre-tax income. 22 
 
(CASH_ETR and MTR) regressions.  This result holds even after controlling for firm 
profitability, leverage, and foreign operations, and suggests that PE ownership is an important 
determinant of tax avoidance at private firms.  Furthermore, the CASH_ETR regression results 
indicate that PE-backed firms pay 14.2 percent less income tax per dollar of adjusted pre-tax 
income than non-PE-backed private firms, even after controlling for NOLs and leverage.  The 
14.2 percent translates to $3.603 million in tax savings for the average PE-backed private firm.
21 
[PLACE TABLE 3 HERE] 
Several control variables are also significant in Table 3.  Consistent with prior research 
(e.g., Graham 1996), the coefficient on LEV is negative and significant in the CASH_ETR and 
MTR regressions.  This result suggests that firms that are more highly levered have lower cash 
and marginal tax rates and perhaps less need for non-debt tax shields.  The coefficients on LOSS 
and NOL are significantly negative in some regressions, indicating that less profitable firms and 
firms with NOLs pay less tax, as indicated by the negative coefficients in the MTR regression, 
and hence, have less incentive for tax planning, as indicated by the negative coefficients in the 
BTD regression.  Consistent with firms with foreign operations having greater opportunities for 
tax avoidance, the coefficients on MNC are positive in the BTD and DTAX regressions.  The 
coefficient on INTANG is significantly positive in the BTD regression, indicating that firms with 
more intangible assets have greater book-tax differences and lower cash ETRs.  The results in 
Table 3 also indicate that abnormal accruals are positively associated with two measures of 
nonconforming tax planning (i.e., BTD and DTAX).  This result is consistent with Frank et al. 
(2009), which finds that financial and tax reporting aggressiveness are strongly positively 
                                                            
21 The BTD and DTAX regressions are based on 2,115 observations with all requisite COMPUSTAT data.  The 
CASH_ETR regression is based on just 939 observations because we require firms to have positive pre-tax income 
and cash taxes paid in this regression, while the MTR regression is based on just 1,142 observations because MTR 
data is not available for all observations included in the BTD and DTAX regressions.   23 
 
related, and Phillips et al. (2003), which finds that temporary book-tax differences, which are 
embedded in BTD, reflect earnings management activity.  Finally, the coefficient on INV_MILLS 
is positive but not significant, consistent with sample selection bias having little impact on our 
coefficient estimates.
22,  23 
Results for Majority PE-Backed Private Firms vs. Minority PE-Backed Private Firms 
We now turn to the results for tests of H2, which predicts that private firms with majority 
PE ownership engage in different levels of tax avoidance than private firms with minority PE 
ownership.  We empirically capture majority PE ownership in MAJORITY_PE, which equals one 
if 50 percent or more of a company is owned by a PE firm, and zero otherwise.  Table 4 contains 
the descriptive statistics that compare majority and minority PE-backed private firms.  Panel A 
presents the results for broad firm characteristics, while Panel B presents the results for the 
measures of tax avoidance.   
[PLACE TABLE 4 HERE] 
The statistics in Panel A suggest that majority PE-backed private firms are not 
statistically different from minority PE-backed private firms in many respects, including 
profitability (ROA, RNOA, CFO, LOSS), leverage (LEV), interest expense (INT_EXP), and 
abnormal accruals (AB_ACCR).  However, majority PE-backed firms are more likely to have 
foreign operations (MNC), report more total and intangible assets (ASSETS and INTANG), but 
have lower revenues (SALES).  Thus, there are several significant operating differences between 
majority and minority PE-backed private firms. 
                                                            
22 Stolzenberg and Relles (1997) argue that if selection bias is moderate then the two-step estimation approach can 
make estimates worse.  In untabulated results we re-estimate equation (1) after excluding INV_MILLS and our 
primary inferences are unchanged.  We lose 18 observations in the equation (1) regression due to missing values 
needed to compute the INV_MILLS ratio.    
23 Tables 2 and 3 compare the tax avoidance of all PE-backed firms to non-PE-backed firms.  Untabulated analyses 
reveal that all results hold for comparisons of both majority PE-backed firms versus non-PE-backed firms and 
minority PE-backed firms versus non-PE-backed firms, with majority PE-backed firms exhibiting the greatest 
amount of tax avoidance.  24 
 
Panel B contains descriptive statistics for the measures of tax avoidance.  The results 
indicate that majority PE-backed firms engage in more tax avoidance than minority PE-backed 
firms.  In particular, majority PE-backed firms exhibit higher mean book-tax differences (BTD) 
and discretionary book-tax differences (DTAX), but lower cash effective tax rates (CASH_ETR) 
and marginal tax rates (MTR).  The correlations in Panel C are consistent with the results in 
Panel B.  Specifically, the indicator variable for majority PE-backed firm-years 
(MAJORITY_PE) is significantly, positively correlated with BTD and DTAX and significantly, 
negatively correlated with CASH_ETR and MTR.   
Table 5 contains the regression results for tests of H2.  The coefficients on 
MAJORITY_PE in all four regressions suggest that majority PE-backed firms engage in more tax 
avoidance than minority PE-backed firms.  In particular, the coefficients on MAJORITY_PE are 
significant and positive in the BTD and DTAX regressions and significant and negative in the 
CASH_ETR and MTR regressions.  These results are consistent with majority ownership 
providing PE firms greater opportunities to promote effective tax strategies at portfolio 
companies than minority ownership.  Moreover, the CASH_ETR regression results indicate that 
firms that are majority-owned by PE firms pay 10.8 percent less income tax per dollar of 
adjusted pre-tax income than firms that are minority-owned by PE firms, even after controlling 
for variables known to impact cash ETRs, including LEV.
24    
[PLACE TABLE 5 HERE] 
Results for Private Companies that Are Owned by Large vs. Small PE Firms 
                                                            
24  We do not include the INV_MILLS ratio in Tables 5 and 7 because all firms in these analyses are PE-backed.  
Therefore, the Heckman selection model for the presence of PE financing is no longer relevant.  Nonetheless, 
untabulated results that include the inverse mills ratio are consistent with those presented in Tables 5 and 7.   25 
 
Our last set of analyses test H3, which predicts private firms that are owned by large PE 
firms engage in different levels of tax avoidance than private firms that are owned by small PE 
firms.  We empirically capture ownership by a large PE firm in LARGE_PE, which equals one if 
a firm is owned by a large PE firm, and zero otherwise.  To identify a PE firm’s size, we rank all 
PE firms according to the total cumulative amount of capital investment between 1980 and 2005 
as reported in Thomson Financials VentureXpert.  The largest 14 PE firms with more than five 
billion dollars of cumulative capital investment are considered large PE firms (i.e., LARGE_PE = 
1), while the remaining are classified as small PE firms (i.e., LARGE_PE = 0).
25  
Table 6 contains the descriptive statistics that compare private firms that are owned by 
large vs. small PE firms.  The results in Panel A indicate private firms that are owned by large 
PE firms are similar in many dimensions (e.g., ROA, RNOA, CFO, LOSS, INT_EXP, and 
AB_ACCR) to those that are owned by small PE firms.  Nonetheless, the mean and median 
values in Panel A indicate that private firms that are owned by large PE firms are more likely to 
have foreign operations (MNC), report more total and intangible assets (ASSETS and INTANG), 
have higher leverage (LEV) and sales growth (SALES_GR), and greater SALES than private firms 
owned by small PE firms.  Despite the similar rates of profitability between private firms that are 
owned by large vs. small PE firms, the results in Panel B suggest private firms that are owned by 
large PE firms engage in significantly more tax avoidance than private firms that are owned by 
small PE firms.  In particular, private firms that are owned by large PE firms have significantly 
higher mean BTD and DTAX and significantly smaller mean and median CASH_ETR and MTR 
than private firms that are owned by small PE firms.  These results are also supported by the 
correlations in Panel C.   
                                                            
25 In particular, large PE firms include: Warburg Pincus, Carlyle Group, KKR, Apax, Blackstone, Goldman Sachs, 
J.P. Morgan, Welsh Carson Anderson & Stone, Hicks Muse Tate & Furst, 3i Group, Bain Capital, Thomas H. Lee, 
Morgan Stanley, and Cinven.  Small PE firms include all other PE firms. 26 
 
[PLACE TABLE 6 HERE] 
Table 7 contains the regression results for tests of H3, which predicts private firms that 
are owned by large PE firms engage in different levels of tax avoidance than private firms that 
are owned by small PE firms.  The coefficients on all four measures of tax avoidance suggest 
private firms that are owned by large PE firms engage in more tax avoidance than those that are 
owned by small PE firms.  In particular, the coefficients on LARGE_PE are significant and 
positive (negative) in the BTD and DTAX (CASH_ETR and MTR) regressions.  These results are 
consistent with large PE firms possessing greater expertise and resources to facilitate effective 
tax planning at portfolio firms compared to small PE firms.  Furthermore, the CASH_ETR 
regression results indicate firms that are owned by large PE firms pay 5.9 percent less income tax 
per dollar of adjusted pre-tax income than firms that are owned by small PE firms, even after 
controlling for NOLs and leverage.   
[PLACE TABLE 7 HERE] 
Taken together, the results in Tables 2-7 consistently indicate that PE firms possess 
greater expertise and resources to promote greater tax avoidance at portfolio firms relative to 
other owners of private firms.  Majority ownership provides PE firms greater control over their 
portfolio firms than minority ownership, and this greater control translates into more tax 
avoidance at majority PE-backed firms than minority PE-backed firms.  In particular, majority 
PE-backed firms pay 10.8 percent less income tax per dollar of pre-tax income than minority PE-
backed firms.  In addition, our results suggest that large PE firms possess greater tax expertise 
and resources than small PE firms and pay 5.9 percent less income tax per dollar of pre-tax 
income.  In all of our tests, the benefits of tax planning appear to outweigh any potential 
reputational costs for PE firms, since PE firm ownership is consistently associated with greater 27 
 
tax avoidance amongst the sample of privately-held firms.  Prior research asserts that PE firms 
strictly monitor and control their portfolio firms with the intent of creating economic value (e.g. 
Cotter and Peck 2001; Lerner 1995; Renneboog and Simons 2005).  Thus, our results are 
consistent with PE firms utilizing tax avoidance as a tool to increase shareholder value.  
Supplemental Analyses 
Robustness Test of Ownership Stake vs. PE Firm Size 
To determine whether the results reported in Table 7 are driven by PE ownership stake, 
we perform additional analyses that compare private firms that are majority-owned by large vs. 
small PE firms, and private firms that are minority-owned by large vs. small PE firms.
26  The 
untabulated results reveal that inferences from Table 7 generally hold regardless of ownership 
stake.  Specifically, inferences from Table 7 are unchanged when comparing private firms that 
are majority-owned by large vs. small PE firms (with the exception of the coefficient on 
LARGE_PE in the DTAX regression, which is positive as expected but has a two-sided t-statistic 
of 1.55).  Inferences from Table 7 are also similar when comparing private firms that are 
minority-owned by large vs. small PE firms; however, the coefficient on LARGE_PE is positive 
but no longer significant in the BTD regression (two-sided t-statistics of 1.39).  In sum, the 
results in Table 7 are not driven by the level of PE ownership; thus, PE firm size and reputation 
are important factors, beyond ownership control, for PE firms to have a significant impact on 
portfolio firms’ tax planning.   
Employee Stock Options 
Graham, Lang, and Shackelford (2004) find that employee stock options (ESOs) generate 
significant tax savings and reduce marginal tax rates for many large firms, and thus are important 
                                                            
26 Ninety-three percent of firms that are owned by large PE firms are also majority owned, as compared to only 
sixty-nine percent of firms that are owned by small PE firms.  28 
 
non-debt tax shields.  While tax deductions from ESOs reduce cash effective tax rates, they are 
not reflected in BTD, DTAX, or MTR.  Nevertheless, in untabulated analyses we test whether our 
results are sensitive to the tax benefits of ESOs.  We control for the tax benefits of ESOs by 
calculating the difference between a firm’s traditional effective tax rate and its cash effective tax 
rate, which we refer to as ESO_BENEFIT.
27  This variable reflects the tax benefits of ESOs, as 
well as a firm’s tax contingency (a.k.a., tax cushion) and timing differences caused by estimated 
tax payments.  Thus, ESO_BENEFIT contains measurement error as a proxy for the tax benefits 
of ESOs, but hand-collection of stock option data would be excessively costly.  When we include 
ESO_BENEFIT and its interaction with PE_BACKED, MAJORITY_PE, and LARGE_PE in the 
equation (1) regressions, our results are qualitatively similar to those shown in Tables 3, 5, and 7.  
We conclude that our results are not driven by any significant differences in the use of ESOs 
between the different groups of private firms. 
Inferences from Tax Footnote Data  
To more precisely identify the specific methods of tax avoidance used by private firms, 
we hand-collected tax footnote information from audited financial reports.  In particular, we 
hand-collected data regarding the components of:  1) temporary book-tax differences from 
deferred tax asset and liability schedules [where positive (negative) values represent net deferred 
tax assets (liabilities), which are then scaled by total assets and multiplied by 1,000 to avoid 
small values], and 2) “permanent” book-tax differences from statutory reconciliation schedules 
[where positive (negative) values represent items that cause a firm’s effective tax rate to be 
                                                            
27 We do not include ESO_BENEFIT in our tabulated regression results because this variable requires firms to have 
positive pretax income (due to the reliance on cash effective tax rates), and we do not want to limit our sample to 
firms with positive pretax income.   29 
 
higher (lower) than the statutory U.S. tax rate].
28  Three of our measures of tax avoidance, BTD, 
DTAX, and CASH_ETR, reflect temporary and/or permanent book-tax differences.  Thus, this 
analysis reveals the sources of variation in those tax avoidance measures.  Table 8 contains 
descriptive statistics for the hand-collected data for majority PE-backed, minority PE-backed, 
and non-PE-backed private firms.
29 
[PLACE TABLE 8 HERE] 
The results in Table 8 indicate that comparisons of the aggregate measures of tax 
avoidance for our hand-collected sub-samples are generally similar to those in Tables 2 and 4 
except the t-statistics for differences are smaller, likely due to the smaller sample sizes.  In 
particular, both PE-backed private firms and majority PE-backed private firms have higher mean 
and median BTD and DTAX and lower CASH_ETR and MTR than non-PE-backed private firms, 
and minority PE-backed private firms, respectively.   
We classified each deferred tax asset and liability disclosed in the tax footnotes in one of 
seven categories:  1) accruals and reserves (ACCR_RES), 2) depreciation and amortization 
(DEP_AMORT), 3) sale and leaseback transactions (SALE_LEAS), 4) inventory 
(INVENTORY), 5) the valuation allowance account (VAA), 6) stock-based compensation 
(STOCK_COMP), and 7) other (OTHER).  Because changes in deferred tax assets and 
liabilities generate deferred tax expense (and benefit), we compute the changes in each of these 
deferred tax accounts.  Positive values for these items indicate an increase in a deferred tax asset 
or a decrease in tax expense.  Thus, we expect PE-backed (majority-PE-backed) firms to report 
more negative changes in their deferred tax accounts than non-PE-backed (minority-PE-backed) 
                                                            
28 “Permanent” book-tax differences include “traditional” permanent differences (e.g., tax-exempt interest and non-
deductible expenses) and other items that cause a firm’s effective tax rate to differ from the U.S. statutory rate (e.g. 
foreign and state tax rate differentials and tax credits).   
29 For brevity, we do not tabulate results for private firms that are owned by large versus small PE firms.  For sample 
selection method see discussion in Section IV. 30 
 
firms, if they engage in nonconforming tax planning that generates a temporary book-tax 
difference (such that taxable income is lower than book income). 
The results in Table 8 suggest that compared to non-PE-backed firms, PE-backed firms 
report smaller changes in deferred tax accounts related to accruals and reserves (ACCR_RES), 
sale and leaseback transactions (SALE_LEAS), and other deferred tax assets and liabilities 
(OTHER), but larger INVENTORY and STOCK_COMP.  The results also suggest that 
compared to minority-PE-backed firms, majority-PE-backed firms report smaller ACCR_RES 
and OTHER, but larger changes in most other deferred tax accounts.  Taken together, we 
conclude that to the extent that PE-backed firms systematically avoid taxes in a temporarily 
nonconforming manner, then they mainly utilize tax strategies that generate deferred taxes 
classified as accruals and reserves, sale and leaseback, and/or other.
30 
We classified each statutory reconciliation item disclosed in the tax footnotes in one of 
nine categories, which include items related to:  1) foreign taxes (FOR_TAX), 2) state taxes 
(STATE_TAX), 3) intangible assets (INTANG), 4) tax-exempt income (TAX_EXEMPT), 5) non-
deductible expenses (NONDED_EXP), 6) tax contingencies, aka “tax reserves” (TAX_RESERV), 
7) tax credits (TAX_CREDITS), 8) change in the valuation allowance account (VAA)
31, and 9) 
other (OTHER).  Statutory reconciliation schedules contain items that cause a firm’s effective tax 
rate to differ from the statutory U.S. tax rate.  If a firm engages in nonconforming tax planning 
that causes its effective tax rate to be lower than the statutory tax rate, then the firm will report a 
                                                            
30 Examples of ACCR_RES are those related to:  prepaid pension costs, benefit plan costs, self-insurance reserves, 
restructuring and other reserves, reserves not currently deductible, allowance for doubtful accounts, and warranty 
reserves.  Phillips, Pincus, Rego, and Wan (2004) show that these deferred tax assets and liabilities can reflect 
upward earnings management to meet or beat an earnings target.  These findings may not apply to our sample, since 
Katz (2009) finds that PE-backed firms employ less upward earnings management than non-PE-backed firms.  
Nonetheless, we control for earnings management in our multivariate regressions. 
31 Firms are required to disclose the beginning and ending balance of the valuation allowance account in the deferred 
tax asset and liability schedule, and if the change in that account is considered material, then it should also be 
disclosed as a separate item in the statutory reconciliation schedule. 31 
 
negative statutory reconciliation item.  Thus, we expect PE-backed (majority-PE-backed) firms 
to report more negative statutory reconciliation items than non-PE-backed (minority-PE-backed) 
firms, if they avoid taxes in a “permanently” nonconforming manner. 
The results in Table 8 suggest that compared to non-PE-backed firms, PE-backed firms 
report more negative statutory reconciliation items related to foreign taxes (FOR_TAX), 
intangible assets (INTANG), tax-exempt income (TAX_EXEMPT), and tax credits 
(TAX_CREDIT).  Except for TAX_CREDIT, the results are similar for the comparison of 
majority-PE-backed and minority-PE-backed firms.  The differences in INTANG are likely 
caused – at least in part – by the different financial and tax accounting rules for goodwill, rather 
than tax avoidance.
32  The differences in FOR_TAX are likely caused by U.S. tax avoidance 
through low-tax foreign operations, and the differences in TAX_EXEMPT and TAX_CREDIT are 
also likely reflective of common tax strategies.
33  In sum, the results in Table 8 indicate that PE-
backed firms utilize foreign operations, tax-exempt investments, as well as tax credits to reduce 
their tax liabilities. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the tax planning at firms with different private ownership 
structures.  In particular, we examine whether PE-backed private firms engage in more or less 
tax avoidance than other privately-held firms.  Our results indicate that PE-backed firms engage 
                                                            
32 Because non-PE-backed firms and minority-PE-backed firms report positive INTANG on average (while PE-
backed and majority-PE-backed firms report negative INTANG on average), we infer that the statistical differences 
in INTANG across the sub-samples are caused – at least in part – by the different book and tax accounting rules for 
goodwill, rather than tax avoidance.  A positive statutory reconciliation item related to intangibles is consistent with 
the existence of goodwill for book purposes but not for tax purposes, a common phenomenon since the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act.  This result underscores the importance of controlling for intangible assets that cause book-tax 
differences but are not related to tax avoidance in our multivariate regressions. 
33 Although many firms in our hand-collected sub-samples used the generic terms “income exempt from tax” and 
“tax-exempt income”, one firm disclosed a negative statutory reconciliation item for “increase in cash surrender 
value of officers’ life insurance”, consistent with the use of corporate-owned life insurance policies as a tax planning 
tool. 32 
 
in significantly more nonconforming tax planning and have lower marginal tax rates than other 
private firms.  We find that PE-backed firms pay 14.2 percent less income tax per dollar of 
adjusted pre-tax income than non-PE-backed private firms, even after controlling for the 
presence of NOLs and debt tax shields.  In addition, we find that majority PE-backed firms 
engage in more tax avoidance than minority PE-backed firms and that portfolio firms that are 
owned by larger PE firms engage in more tax avoidance than portfolio firms that are owned by 
smaller PE firms.  Results from the tax footnote analyses are consistent with portfolio firms 
using sale and leaseback transactions, foreign operations, tax-exempt investments, and tax credits 
to reduce their income taxes.  
Taken together, our results are consistent with PE firms having the resources and 
expertise to promote greater tax avoidance at portfolio firms, and this effect is magnified for 
portfolio firms that are either majority-owned or owned by larger PE firms.  Our results are also 
consistent with the benefits of tax planning outweighing the associated costs for our PE portfolio 
firms (and their PE firm owners), including any potential reputational costs associated with 
aggressive tax avoidance.   
To our knowledge, this is the first study to compare the tax practices of firms with 
different private ownership structures and to document that PE firms utilize tax planning in their 
portfolio firms as an additional source of economic value, above and beyond debt tax shields.  
Our study should be of interest to tax regulators that are concerned with the tax practices of 
private firms in general and PE-backed firms in particular, and to researchers that are interested 
in the impact of ownership structure on tax avoidance activity.  In addition, our investigation into 
the tax practices of companies owned by PE firms should be of interest to critics that contend PE 
firms extract excessive tax benefits from their portfolio firms.    33 
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Measures of Tax Avoidance: 
 
BTD  = Firm i’s book-tax differences, which equal book income less taxable income scaled 
by lagged total assets.  Book income is pre-tax income (#170) in year t.  Taxable 
income is calculated by summing current federal tax expense (#63) and current 
foreign tax expense (#64) and dividing by the statutory tax rate (STR) and then 
subtracting the change in NOL carryforwards (#52) in year t.  If current federal tax 
expense is missing, total current tax expense is calculated by subtracting deferred 
taxes (#50), state income taxes (#173) and other income taxes (#211) from total 
income taxes (#16) in year t. 
 
DTAX  = Firm i’s residual from the following regression, estimated by industry and year:  
PERMDIFFit = 0 + 1 INTANGit + 2 UNCONit + 3 MIit + 4 CSTEit + 5 NOLit 
+ 6 LAGPERMit + eit; where PERMDIFF = Total book-tax differences – 
temporary book-tax differences = [{BI – [(CFTE +CFOR) / STR]} – (DTE / STR)], 
scaled by beginning of year assets (#6); BI = pretax book income (#170); CFTE = 
current federal tax expense (#63); CFOR = current foreign tax expense (#64); STR = 
statutory tax rate; DTE = deferred tax expense (#50); INTANG = goodwill and other 
intangible assets (#33), scaled by beginning of year assets (#6); UNCON = income 
(loss) reported under the equity method (#55), scaled by beginning of year assets 
(#6); MI = income (loss) attributable to minority interest (#49), scaled by beginning 
of year assets (#6); CSTE = current state tax expense (#173), scaled by beginning of 
year assets; NOL = change in net operating loss carryforwards (#52), scaled by 
beginning of year assets (#6); LAGPERM = PERMDIFF in year t-1. 
 
CASH_ETR  = Firm i’s cash effective tax rate, which equals cash taxes paid (Compustat #317), 
divided by pretax net income (#170) minus special items (#17) in year t. 
CASH_ETR is set to missing when the denominator is zero or negative.  We 
truncate CASH_ETR to the range [0,1]. 
 
   
MTR  = After financing marginal tax rate, which equals the simulated marginal tax rate after 
both depreciation and financing related tax shields (Graham 1996; Graham , 
Lemmon and Schallheim 1998). 
 
Private Firm Indicator Variables: 
 
PE_BACKED  = 1 if a PE firm has a majority or minority ownership stake in a private company and 0 
otherwise.  
 
LARGE_PE  = 1 if the firms is one of the following: Warburg Pincus, Carlyle Group, KKR, Apax, 
Blackstone, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Welsh Carson Anderson & Stone, Hicks 
Muse Tate & Furst, 3i Group, Bain Capital, Thomas H. Lee, Morgan Stanley, and 
Cinven and 0 for all other PE firms. PE firms are ranked according to total U.S. 
dollar investment during the years 1980-2005. (Source: Thomson Financials, 
VentureXpert.) 
 
MAJORITY_PE  = 1 if 50 percent or more of the firm is backed by private equity firms and 0 otherwise. 40 
 
 
Control Variables and Other Variables of Interest: 
 
LEV  = Firm i’s leverage in year t, measured as total debt (#9+#34) divided by total assets 
(#6); 
 
LOSS  = 1 if firm i reports a loss, where loss is net income before extraordinary items (#123) 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
NOL  = 1 if firm i has net operating loss carryforwards (#52) available at the beginning of 
year t, and 0 otherwise. 
 
MNC  =1 if firm i has foreign income taxes or refunds  (#64) or foreign pretax income or loss 
(#273) in year t, and 0 otherwise.  
   
INT_EXP  = Firm i’s interest expense (#15) in year t, scaled by lagged total assets 
 
INTANG  = Firm i’s intangible assets (#33) in year t, scaled by lagged total assets. 
 
EQ_EARN  = Firm i’s equity income in earnings (#55) in year t, scaled by lagged total assets. 
 
SALES_GR  = Firm i’s sales growth, where sales growth is sales (#12) at the end of year t minus 
sales at the beginning of year t divided by sales at the beginning of year t.  
 
AB_ACCR  = Firm i’s abnormal total accruals in year t computed derived from the modified cross-
sectional Jones (1991) model.  To estimate the model yearly by two-digit SIC code, 
we require that at least 10 observations be available.  The regression is: TACCj,t / 
TAj, t–1 = a1*[1 / TAj, t–1] + a2*[(ΔREVj, t – ΔTRj, t)/TAj, t–1] + a3*[PPEj, t / TAj, t–1] 
where: TACC is total accruals for firm j in year t, which is defined as income before 
extraordinary items (#123) minus net cash flow from operating activities, adjusted 
to extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#308 – #124).  For the years 
prior to 1988, TACC is defined as Δ(current assets #4) – Δ(current liabilities #5) – 
Δ(cash #1) + Δ(short-term debt #34) – (depreciation and amortization #125).  To 
correct for measurement errors in the balance-sheet approach, we eliminate firm-
year observations with "non-articulating" events (Hribar and Collins 2002).  TA is 
the beginning-of-the-year total assets (lagged #6). ΔREV is the change in sales in 
year t (#12), PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment in year t (#7), and ΔTR is 
the change in trade receivables in year t (#151).  To control for the asymmetric 
recognition of gains and losses, the modified Jones model is augmented with the 
following independent variables: cash flow from operations in year t (CFt), a 
dummy variable set to 1 if CFt <1 and 0 otherwise (DCFt), and an interactive 
variable, CFt × DCFt (as suggested by Ball and Shivakumar 2006).  CFt is defined, 
for years after 1988, as cash from operations in year t adjusted for extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations (#308 – #124), and prior to 1988 as funds from 
operations (#110) – Δ(current assets #4) + Δ(cash and cash equivalent #1) + 
Δ(current liabilities #5) – Δ(short-term debt #34).  All variables are standardized by 
total assets at year-end t-1. 
 




RNOA  = Firm i’s return on net operating assets defined as operating income divided by net 
operating assets.  Operating income is net income (#172) + Δ(cumulative translation 
adjustment #230) + after-tax interest expense (#15) – after-tax interest income (#62) 
+ minority interest in income (#49). Net operating assets (NOA) are common equity 
(#60) + debt in current liabilities (#34) + total long-term debt (#9) + preferred stock 
(#130) – cash and short-term investments (#1) – investments and advances (#32) + 
minority interest (#38); (see Nissim and Penman 2003). 
 
SALES  = Firm i’s total sales (#12) for year t. 
 
CFO  = Firm i’s cash flows from continuing operations (#308 - #124) for year t, scaled by 
lagged total assets. 
 
ASSETS  = Natural logarithm of the total assets (#6) for firm i, at the end of year t.  
 
INV_MILLS  = The inverse mills ratio from Heckman (1979) two-stage sample selection correction 
procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the following probit model (results not 
tabulated):  
 
PE_BACKED = 0 + 1BVE + 2RNOA + 3Q_RATIO + 4OPER_CYCLE + 
5FIRM_AGE + 6CASH + 7CAP_EXP + 8BIG_AUDIT + 9LOSS + 
10NOL + 11LEV + 12MNC + 13INTANG + 14EQ_EARN + 
15SALES_GR + 16AB_ACCR +17ASSETS +   
 
Where:  BVE = book value of equity (Compustat #60t + #130t + #35t, scaled by #6t-
1); RNOA = profitability (defined as operating income divided by net operating 
assets, see above), Q_RATIO = quick ratio [cash and short-term investments (#1t) + 
total receivables (#2t), scaled by current liabilities (#5t)], OPER_CYCLE = length of 
operating cycle [calculated as (yearly average accounts receivable (#2t)) / (total 
revenues (#12t)/360) + (yearly average inventory (#3t)) / (cost of goods 
sold(#41t)/360)], FIRM_AGE = firm age (years since first appearance on 
Compustat), CASH = cash holdings (#1t scaled by #6t-1), CAP_EXP = capital 
expenditures (#128t) scaled by #6t-1, LOSS = 1 if net income (#172) less than zero, 
and 0 otherwise; and BIG_AUDIT = an indicator variable for large accounting firms 
(#149t).  All other variables as defined above.  We use the estimates from the first-
stage probit model to compute the inverse Mills’ ratio for each sample firm-year.  
The inverse Mills’ ratio serves as a control variable in equation (1), which is the 
second step of the Heckman estimation procedure.
34  
 
STR  = Firm i’s statutory tax rate.  From 1980 to 1986 the STR is 46%, for 1987 the STR is 
40%, from 1988 to 1992 the STR is 34%, from 1993 to 2005 the STR is 35%. 
 
                                                            
34 Inverse Mills ratio is defined as: λ(Z) = φ(Ζ)/Ф(Z) if private or PE-backed = 1, and λ(Z) = -φ(Ζ)/(1 − Ф(Z)) if 
private or PE-backed = 0, where: φ(Ζ) is the standard normal pdf, Ф(Z) is the standard normal cdf, and Z are the 
estimates of the first stage probit model. 42 
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* Approximately ten percent of the total gain is usually distributed to the management team as part of performance based 
compensation, reducing the investors’ share to approximately seventy percent (Fruhan 2009)   
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Sample Selection Procedures for Private Firms with Public Debt (1980 – 2005) 
 
  No. of Firm-year 
Observations  No. of Firms
“Potential” private firms with public debt 
(COMPUSTAT)
a  13,062 3,355 
Eliminate firms that:    
Do not have historical (non-prospectus) data
b  (3,233) (1,242) 
Are public firms   (2,324)  (371) 
Are subsidiaries of public firms  (561)  (102) 
Are public spin-offs  (111)  (34) 
Are involved in bankruptcy proceedings (295)  (100) 
Have insufficient information   (1,683)  (344) 
Are foreign firms   (772)  (184) 
Other
c (918)  (396) 
Subtotal of private firms with public debt  3,165 582 
Eliminate firms that:    
Are cooperatives, LPs, government-owned and firms 
for which ownership structure cannot be ascertained  (550) (59) 
Private firms with public debt   2,615  523 
Private firms that are majority-owned by PE firms  1,404  318 
Private firms that are minority-owned by PE firms  339  75 
Private firms without PE ownership   872  130 
 
a The sample of “potential” private firms with public debt consists of all firm-year observations on Compustat in any 
year from 1978 to 2005 that satisfy the following criteria: (1) the firm’s stock price at fiscal year-end is unavailable, 
(2) the firm has total debt as well as total revenues exceeding $1 million, (3) the firm is a domestic company, (4) the 
firm is not a subsidiary of another public firm, and (5) the firm is not a financial institution or in a regulated 
industry (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4800-4900). 
b Compustat reports three years of historical information for public firms that file for initial public offering. This 
financial information is taken from the prospectus.   
c  “Other” includes observations of the same firm with different names, firms that do not have information for 
consecutive years, firms that have joint ventures and partnerships with public firms, holding companies of public 







Descriptive Statistics that Compare PE-Backed Private Firms (Upper Rows, in Bold) to Non-PE-Backed Private Firms 
(Lower Rows, No Bold) 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics for Firm Characteristics 
   25
th    75
th Standard  Difference  between: 
 #  Obs  Percentile  Mean  Median  Percentile  Deviation  Mean  Median 
ROA  1,743  -0.039 -0.004 0.000 0.039 0.262  -0.071*** -0.025** 
  872  -0.001 0.068 0.026 0.114 0.461     
              
RNOA  1,743 -0.068  -0.029  -0.012  0.038  0.163  -0.108*** -0.052** 
  872  -0.010 0.079 0.040 0.140 0.185     
             
CFO  1,649  0.017  0.065 0.054 0.098 0.099  -0.019*** -0.011*** 
  722  0.027  0.084 0.065 0.145 0.115     
              
LOSS  1,743  0.000  0.557 1.000 1.000 0.497  0.226*** 1.000*** 
  872  0.000  0.331 0.000 1.000 0.448     
              
NOL  1,743  0.000  0.347 0.000 1.000 0.476  0.139*** 0.000 
  872  0.000  0.208 0.000 0.000 0.388     
              
LEV  1,743  0.518  0.706 0.673 0.819 0.363  0.139*** 0.091*** 
  872  0.193  0.567 0.582 0.688 0.334     
              
INT_EXP  1,743  0.057  0.084 0.082 0.105 0.042  0.013* 0.015* 
  872  0.027  0.071 0.067 0.087 0.043     
              
MNC  1,743  0.000  0.447 0.000 1.000 0.498  0.124*** 0.000 
  872  0.000  0.323 0.000 1.000 0.468     
              
INTANG  1,743  0.000  0.258 0.156 0.356 0.446  0.118*** 0.153*** 
  872  0.000  0.140 0.003 0.125 0.406     
              
EQ_EARN  1,743  0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008  -0.003 0.000 
  872  0.000  0.004 0.000 0.000 0.103     
              
SALES_GR  1,743  -0.035 0.097 0.004 0.103 0.695  -0.016 -0.020 45 
 
  872  -0.007 0.113 0.024 0.121 0.644     
              
AB_ACCR  1,416 -0.058  -0.025  -0.018  0.018  0.099  -0.026*** -0.021*** 
  717  -0.026 0.001 0.003 0.032 0.078     
              
SALES  1,743  227  773 430 836  1,204  -292*** 46** 
  872 188  1,065  384  1,060  2,921     
              
ASSETS  1,743  5.325  5.922 5.926 6.500 1.060  0.192*** 0.240*** 
  872  4.980  5.730 5.686 6.620 1.420     
                
Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Tax Avoidance 
   25
th    75
th Standard  Difference  between: 
  # Obs  Percentile  Mean  Median  Percentile  Deviation  Mean  Median 
BTD  1,743 -0.048  -0.019  -0.013  0.007  0.078 0.015*** 0.002 
  872 -0.022  -0.034  -0.015  0.032  0.071     
              
DTAX  1,743  -0.081 -0.049 0.011 0.094 0.249  0.026** 0.016* 
  872 -0.032  -0.075  -0.005  0.078  0.323     
              
CASH_ETR  684  0.085  0.318 0.264 0.450 0.282  -0.033** -0.034** 
  436  0.104  0.351 0.298 0.441 0.271     
              
MTR  732  0.000  0.123 0.024 0.292 0.146  -0.088*** -0.256*** 
  508  0.024  0.211 0.280 0.350 0.165     
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Differences between means are tested for significance using a two-tailed t-test; 
differences in medians are tested for significance using a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test.  All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel C:  Pearson (Spearman) Correlation Coefficients for PE_BACKED and Measures of Tax Avoidance 
  PE_BACKED  BTD DTAX  CASH_ETR  MTR 
PE_BACKED  ---- 0.067*** 0.078***  -0.064***  -0.329*** 
BTD  0.071*** ----  0.027 -0.383***  0.366*** 
DTAX  0.067** 0.067**  ----  0.019 -0.084*** 
CASH_ETR  -0.060** -0.557***  -0.001 ---- 0.054* 






Results for OLS Regressions of Measures of Tax Avoidance on Indicator Variable for PE Ownership (PE_BACKED) and 
Controls for Determinants of Corporate Tax Avoidance, where the Comparison Sample is a Sample of Non-PE-Backed 
Private Firms 
 
 BTD  DTAX  CASH_ETR  MTR 
  Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat 
Intercept -0.002  -0.16  0.071  1.99**  0.367  7.02***  0.326  17.18*** 
PE_BACKED  0.011 1.81* 0.033 1.87* -0.142  -4.16***  -0.087  -6.19*** 
LOSS  -0.072 -10.58*** -0.005  -0.17      -0.135  -8.27*** 
LOSS×PE_BACKED  0.001 0.06 -0.001  -0.04      0.007 0.44 
NOL  -0.011 -1.58 0.036 1.12 -0.053 -1.51 -0.198  -13.75*** 
NOL×PE_BACKED  0.007 0.90 0.050 1.29 0.039 0.85 0.087  5.36*** 
LEV  0.010 0.94 0.027 0.67 -0.239  -5.31***  -0.093  -5.02*** 
LEV×PE_BACKED  0.003 0.24 0.009 0.19 0.305  5.12***  0.081  3.95*** 
MNC  0.016 6.09*** 0.026  1.56  -0.089  -4.77***  -0.012  -1.05 
INTANG  0.019 1.77*      -0.055  -3.65***  0.009  0.57 
EQ_EARN  0.038 9.65***      -0.001  -0.02  0.021 2.67*** 
SALES_GR  -0.014 -2.69*** 0.008  0.65  -0.032 -2.61*** 0.015  0.99 
AB_ACCR  0.218 5.62*** 0.422 3.16*** -0.089  -0.51  -0.006  -0.14 
ASSETS  0.005 2.83*** -0.006  -1.21  0.005  0.64  0.002  0.83 
INV_MILLS  0.031 1.12 -0.015  -0.028  0.071 1.04 0.020 0.74 
          
Adjusted R-Squared  0.3656 0.0714 0.1609 0.4823 
N  2,115 2,115  939  1,142 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A.  Regressions include industry and year 





Descriptive Statistics that Compare Majority-Owned PE-Backed Private Firms (Upper Rows, in Bold) to Minority-Owned 
PE-Backed Private Firms (Lower Rows, No Bold) 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics for Firm Characteristics 
   25
th    75
th Standard Difference  between: 
 #  Obs  Percentile  Mean  Median  Percentile  Deviation  Mean  Median 
ROA  1,404 -0.039 -0.003 0.000 0.039 0.286 0.003 -0.002 
  339 -0.033  -0.006  0.002  0.046  0.128     
          
RNOA  1,404 -0.069 -0.029 -0.012 0.039 0.155 0.002 0.001 
  339 -0.057  -0.031  -0.013  0.036  0.193     
          
CFO  1,335 0.014 0.065 0.053 0.098 0.099  -0.005 -0.006 
  314 0.026  0.069  0.059  0.100  0.097     
          
LOSS  1,404 0.000 0.554 1.000 1.000 0.497  -0.015 0.000 
  339 0.000  0.569  1.000  1.000  0.569     
          
NOL  1,404 0.000 0.362 0.000 1.000 0.481  0.075*** 0.000 
  339 0.000  0.287  0.000  1.000  0.453     
          
LEV  1,404 0.511 0.704 0.671 0.822 0.357  -0.010 -0.014 
  339 0.541  0.714  0.685  0.808  0.387     
          
INT_EXP  1,404 0.054 0.083 0.079 0.104 0.042  -0.007 -0.008 
  339 0.068  0.090  0.087  0.111  0.037     
          
MNC  1,404 0.000 0.479 0.000 1.000 0.498  0.161*** 0.000 
  339  0.000  0.318  0.000  1.000  0.466    
          
INTANG  1,404 0.001 0.283 0.173 0.387 0.485  0.124*** 0.120*** 
  339 0.000  0.159  0.053  0.271  0.211     
          
EQ_EARN  1,404 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.000 
  339 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002     
          
SALES_GR  1,404 -0.043 0.099 0.000 0.100 0.743 0.005 -0.022 48 
 
  339 -0.019  0.094  0.022  0.110  0.462     
          
AB_ACCR  1,137 -0.058 -0.025 -0.018 0.018 0.099 0.002 -0.002 
  279 -0.054  -0.027  -0.016  0.015  0.102     
          
SALES  1,404 225  732  422  814 1,104  -206** -28 
  339 238 938 450 898  1,529     
          
ASSETS  1,404 5.367 5.950 5.960 6.530 0.970  0.110* 0.245** 
  339 5.220  5.840  5.715  6.340  1.010     
             
Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Tax Avoidance 
   25
th    75
th Standard Difference  between: 
  #  Obs  Percentile  Mean Median  Percentile  Deviation  Mean Median 
BTD  1,404 -0.049 -0.013 -0.013 0.008 0.078  0.030*** 0.005 
  339 -0.051  -0.043  -0.018  0.005 0.079     
          
DTAX  1,404 -0.095 -0.043 0.011 0.115 0.241  0.030** 0.016** 
  339 -0.054  -0.073  -0.004  0.053 0.261     
          
CASH_ETR  553  0.081 0.302 0.249 0.417 0.288  -0.083*** -0.068*** 
  131  0.141 0.385 0.317 0.562 0.322     
          
MTR  560  0.000 0.115 0.021 0.271 0.141  -0.032*** -0.048*** 
  172  0.000 0.147 0.069 0.324 0.131     
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Differences between means are tested for significance using a two-tailed t-test; 
differences in medians are tested for significance using a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test.  All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel C:  Pearson (Spearman) Correlation Coefficients for MAJORITY_PE and Measures of Tax Avoidance 
 MAJORITY_PE  BTD  DTAX  CASH_ETR  MTR 
MAJORITY_PE  ---- 0.067***  0.069**  -0.097*** -0.095*** 
BTD  0.074*** ----  0.021 -0.369***  0.273*** 
DTAX  0.064** 0.060***  ----  0.037  -0.025 
CASH_ETR  -0.083** -0.546*** -0.019  ----  0.029 





Results for OLS Regressions of Measures of Tax Avoidance on Indicator Variable for Majority Private Equity Ownership 
(MAJORITY_PE) and Controls for Determinants of Corporate Tax Avoidance, where the Comparison Sample is a Sample of 
Minority-Owned PE-Backed Private Firms 
 
 BTD  DTAX  CASH_ETR  MTR 
  Coeff T-Stat Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff T-Stat  Coeff T-Stat 
Intercept  -0.061 -2.67** 0.144 2.33** 0.192 1.85* 0.153  5.31*** 
MAJORITY_PE  0.020 2.00** 0.033 1.70* -0.108  -2.94***  -0.029  -1.99** 
LOSS  -0.061 -7.11*** -0.077 -2.08**        -0.117  -6.04*** 
LOSS×MAJORITY_PE  -0.007 -0.87 0.091  2.10**        -0.005  -0.36 
NOL  -0.013 -1.56 0.089 1.96* 0.124  1.65*  -0.133  -7.36*** 
NOL×MAJORITY_PE  0.012 1.22 -0.009  -0.18  -0.140  -1.72*  0.033  1.65* 
LEV  0.023 1.52 -0.004  -0.12  0.015  0.15  0.027  2.11*** 
LEV×MAJORITY_PE  -0.012 -0.69 0.049 0.94 0.061 0.57  -0.056  -3.21*** 
MNC  0.013 4.62*** 0.048 2.65** -0.088  -3.59***  -0.009  -0.89 
INTANG  -0.001 -0.06        0.026 0.91  0.017  1.05 
EQ_EARN  0.438 0.87        -2.881  -3.21***  -0.946  -0.91 
SALES_GR  -0.010 -1.90* -0.002 -0.36 -0.026  -2.04**  0.000  -0.02 
AB_ACCR  0.226 4.79*** 0.463 2.81** -0.303 -1.55  -0.002  -0.04 
ASSETS  0.010 3.53*** -0.011 -1.49  0.021 1.83* 0.010  2.59*** 
               
Adjusted R-Squared  0.3749 0.0399  0.1677 0.3786 
N  1,416 1,416 578 693 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A.  Regressions include industry and year 






Descriptive Statistics that Compare Private Firms that Are Owned by Large PE Firms  (Upper Rows, in Bold) to Private 
Firms that Are Owned by Small PE Firms  (Lower Rows, No Bold) 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics for Firm Characteristics 
   25
th    75
th Standard Difference  between: 
 #  Obs  Percentile  Mean  Median  Percentile  Deviation  Mean  Median 
ROA  463  -0.043 0.005 0.004 0.041 0.309 0.011 0.005 
  1,280 -0.037 -0.006 -0.001 0.041  0.248     
          
RNOA  463  -0.079 -0.029 -0.011 0.039  0.172  0.000 0.001 
  1,280 -0.065 -0.029 -0.012 0.037  0.160     
          
CFO  449  0.015 0.069 0.061 0.102 0.091 0.006 0.010 
  1,200 0.017 0.063 0.051 0.093 0.100     
          
LOSS  463  0.000 0.530 1.000 1.000 0.500 -0.042 0.000 
  1,280 0.000 0.572 1.000 1.000 0.495     
          
NOL  463  0.000 0.377 0.000 1.000 0.485  0.038* 0.000 
  1,280 0.000 0.340 0.000 1.000 0.474     
          
LEV  463  0.518 0.756 0.685 0.846 0.419  0.067*** 0.015 
  1,280 0.518 0.689 0.670 0.803 0.341     
          
INT_EXP  463  0.054 0.088 0.081 0.102 0.044 0.004 -0.002 
  1,280 0.057 0.084 0.083 0.106 0.041     
          
MNC  463  0.000 0.536 1.000 1.000 0.499  0.113*** 1.000*** 
  1,280 0.000 0.423 0.000 1.000 0.494     
          
INTANG  463  0.040 0.316 0.219 0.443 0.447  0.078*** 0.077*** 
  1,280 0.000 0.238 0.142 0.337 0.447     
          
EQ_EARN  463  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000  0.000 
  1,280  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.006    
          
SALES_GR  463  -0.041 0.168 0.003 0.116 0.841  0.101** -0.002 51 
 
  1,280 -0.035 0.067 0.005 0.096 0.609     
          
AB_ACCR  370  -0.065 -0.031 -0.023 0.014  0.119 -0.008 -0.006 
  1,046 -0.055 -0.023 -0.017 0.019  0.094     
          
SALES  463 314 875 534 991  1,441  142* 148* 
  1,280  208 733 386 741  1,109     
          
ASSETS  463  5.240 6.230 6.100 6.770 0.854  0.424*** 0.256*** 
  1,280 5.210 5.806 5.844 6.371 1.101     
               
Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Tax Avoidance 
   25
th    75
th Standard Different  between: 
  # Obs  Percentile  Mean  Median  Percentile  Deviation  Mean  Median 
BTD  463  -0.051 -0.015 -0.011 0.010  0.076 0.007* 0.003 
  1,280 -0.047 -0.022 -0.014 0.006  0.077     
          
DTAX  463  -0.151  -0.030 0.011 0.125 0.301  0.027* 0.001 
  1,280 -0.074  -0.057 0.010 0.083 0.282     
          
CASH_ETR  191  0.071 0.288 0.221 0.379 0.274  -0.042*** -0.068** 
  493  0.114 0.330 0.289 0.492 0.303     
          
MTR  178  0.009 0.101 0.015 0.333 0.152  -0.033*** -0.017** 
  554  0.000 0.134 0.032 0.272 0.142     
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Differences between means are tested for significance using a two-tailed t-test; 
differences in medians are tested for significance using a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test.  All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel C:  Pearson (Spearman) Correlation Coefficients for LARGE_PE and Measures of Tax Avoidance 
 LARGE_PE  BTD  DTAX  CASH_ETR  MTR 
LARGE_PE  ---- 0.033**  0.041**  -0.074** -0.114*** 
BTD  0.043** ---- 0.020  -0.367***  0.271*** 
DTAX  0.047** 0.062*  ----  0.044  -0.024 
CASH_ETR  -0.076** -0.541*** 0.024  ----  -0.022 






Results for OLS Regressions of Measures of Tax Avoidance on Indicator Variable for Private Firms that Are Owned by Large PE 
Firms (LARGE_PE) and Controls for Determinants of Corporate Tax Avoidance, where the Comparison Sample is a Sample of 
Private Firms that Are Owned by Small PE Firms 
 
 BTD  DTAX  CASH_ETR  MTR 
  Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat 
Intercept  -0.051 -2.70*** 0.132  2.57**  0.043  0.62  0.192  7.86*** 
LARGE_PE  0.020 2.54** 0.041 1.99** -0.059  -2.99***  -0.030 -1.68* 
LOSS  -0.068 -14.60*** 0.011  0.47        -0.126 -11.25*** 
LOSS×LARGE_PE  -0.005 -0.68 -0.064 -1.28        0.006  0.35 
NOL  0.004 0.84 0.062  2.39**  -0.049  -1.48  -0.099  -10.18*** 
NOL×LARGE_PE  -0.025 -3.06*** 0.067  1.27  0.119  1.80*  -0.031  -1.45 
LEV  0.023 2.76** 0.032  0.83  0.107 2.18**  -0.020 -1.87* 
LEV×LARGE_PE  -0.018 -1.78* -0.011  -0.19  -0.060  -0.71  0.014  0.88 
MNC  0.014 4.48*** 0.057 2.75*** -0.072  -2.87***  -0.008  -0.82 
INTANG  0.003 0.34        -0.002  -0.09  0.015 0.89 
EQ_EARN  0.532 1.11        -4.400  -4.30***  -0.763  -0.64 
SALES_GR  -0.011  -1.99**  -0.003 -0.28 -0.010 -0.80 0.004  0.12 
AB_ACCR  0.235 4.92*** 0.451 2.78*** -0.385 -1.94*  0.004  0.06 
ASSETS  0.010 3.36*** -0.014 -1.79*  0.040 3.44*** 0.007  1.70* 
          
Adjusted R-Squared  0.3788 0.0369 0.1749 0.3746 
N  1,416 1,416  578  693 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All variables are as defined in Appendix A.  Regressions include industry and year indicator 





Means and Medians for Components of Total Book-Tax Differences, Including Changes in 
Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities and Items in the Statutory Reconciliation Schedule 
 
  PE-Backed vs. Non-PE-Backed  PE-Majority vs. PE-Minority 
  PE  Non-PE  T-Stat   Majority  Minority  T-Stat  
            
Measures of Tax Avoidance: 
BTD           
Mean   0.016  -0.011  3.54  0.023  0.008  1.75 
Median 0.008  -0.006  1.66  0.001  -0.014  1.67 
N 76  38    38  38   
DTAX           
Mean   -0.039  -0.122  1.99  -0.020  -0.057  0.80 
Median 0.022  -0.018  0.40  0.025  0.017  0.56 
N 76  38    38  38   
CASH_ETR           
Mean   0.285  0.331  -0.87  0.283  0.287  -0.05 
Median 0.314  0.332  -0.76  0.273  0.390  -1.73 
N 35  27    13  22   
MTR           
Mean   0.134  0.215  -2.38  0.091  0.165  -1.81 
Median 0.045  0.350  -1.74  0.020  0.055  -1.04 
N 31  22    13  18   
  PE-Backed vs. Non-PE-Backed  PE-Majority vs. PE-Minority 
  PE  Non-PE  T-Stat   Majority  Minority  T-Stat  
            
Changes in Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities: 
ACCR_RES           
Mean -2,144.8  1,893.8  -2.02  -3,958.2  -426.8  -1.06 
Median -723.0 913.4  -1.39 -1,352.0 -48.4  -1.13 
 74 38    36 38   
DEP_AMORT           
Mean -985.9  -1,492.1  0.22  -1,273.2  -713.8  0.84 
Median -1,132.8 -1,033.9  -0.07  -1,497.7  -792.7  -0.57 
 74 38    36 38   
SALE_LEAS           
Mean -94.8  575.2  -1.69  0.000  -184.6  1.07 
Median 0.000 0.000  -0.26  0.000 0.000  0.95 
 74 38    36 38   
  54 
 
INVENTORY           
Mean 320.6  -637.0  2.21  959.1  -284.3  1.29 
Median 0.000 0.000  1.27  0.000 0.000  1.33 
 74 38    36 38   
VAA           
Mean -4,225.9  -4,071.3  -0.05  515.3  -8,717.7  1.32 
Median 0.000 0.000  0.68  0.000 0.000  0.39 
 74 38    36 38   
STOCK_COMP           
Mean 185.5  -50.33  1.26  381.4  0.000  1.08 
Median 0.000 0.000  0.83  0.000 0.000  1.48 
 74 38    36 38   
OTHER           
Mean 599.4  1,403.1  -0.45  343.9  841.4  -0.27 
Median 0.004 -89.34  -0.66  -89.18 171.3  -2.17 
N 74  38    36  38   
  PE-Backed vs. Non-PE-Backed  PE-Majority vs. PE-Minority 
  PE  Non-PE  T-Stat   Majority  Minority  T-Stat  
            
Statutory Reconciliation Items: 
FOR_TAX           
Mean -0.020  -0.002  -1.14  -0.051  0.010  -1.12 
Median 0.000  0.000  -0.49  0.000  0.000  -0.34 
N 73  36    36  37   
STATE_TAX           
Mean 0.019  0.022  -0.12  0.015  0.024  -0.14 
Median 0.008  0.011  -0.47  0.002  0.016  -2.21 
N 73  36    36  37   
INTANG           
Mean -0.007  0.038  -1.69  -0.032  0.017  -1.62 
Median 0.000  0.000  -0.41  0.000  0.000  -0.40 
N 73  36    36  37   
TAX_EXEMPT           
Mean -0.015  0.012  -2.33  -0.004  0.001  -1.61 
Median 0.000  0.000  -1.22  0.000  0.000  -1.00 
N 73  36    36  37   
NONDED_EXP           
Mean 0.013  0.001  1.74  0.010  0.016  -0.39 
Median 0.000  0.000  0.06  0.000  0.000  -0.30 
N 73  36    36  37   
TAX_RESERV           
Mean 0.006  0.003  0.61  0.013  -0.001  0.77 
Median 0.000  0.000  0.38  0.000  0.000  -0.31 
N 73  36    36  37   55 
 
TAX_CREDITS           
Mean -0.013  -0.001  -1.67  0.000  -0.025  1.42 
Median 0.000  0.000  -0.03  0.000  0.000  0.66 
N 73  36    36  37   
VAA           
Mean 0.012  0.016  -0.16  -0.010  0.034  -0.91 
Median 0.000  0.000  -0.08  0.000  0.000  -0.52 
N 73  36    36  37   
OTHER           
Mean -0.004  -0.001  -0.13  0.005  -0.013  0.22 
Median 0.000  0.000  -0.08  0.001  0.000  0.83 
N 73  36    36  37   
ETR           
Mean 0.235  0.339  -1.71  0.192  0.278  -0.81 
Median 0.309  0.370  -1.87  0.254  0.335  -0.82 
N 73  36    36  37   
Notes:  Differences between means are tested using a t-test while differences in medians are tested using a Wilcoxon 
signed rank test.  We classified each deferred tax asset and liability disclosed in the tax footnotes in one of seven 
categories:  1) accruals and reserves (ACCR_RES), 2) depreciation and amortization (DEP_AMORT), 3) sale and 
leaseback transactions (SALE_LEAS), 4) inventory (INVENTORY), 5) the valuation allowance account (VAA), 
6) stock-based compensation (STOCK_COMP), and 7) other (OTHER).  Positive (negative) values indicate net 
deferred tax assets (liabilities), scaled by current year total assets and then multiplied by 1,000.  We classified each 
statutory reconciliation item disclosed in the tax footnotes in one of nine categories, which include items related to:  
1) foreign taxes (FOR_TAX), 2) state taxes (STATE_TAX), 3) intangible assets (INTANG), 4) tax-exempt income 
(TAX_EXEMPT), 5) non-deductible expenses (NONDED_EXP), 6) tax contingencies, aka “tax reserves” 
(TAX_RESERV), 7) tax credits (TAX_CREDITS), 8) change in the valuation allowance account (VAA), and 9) other 
(OTHER).  All other variables are as defined in Appendix A 
 
 